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Legal and Policy Conflicts Between Deed Covenants and
Subsequently Enacted Zoning Ordinances
I.

INTRODUCTION

Increases in population density during the past several decades have
sharply focused the need for effective devices of land use control. As a
matter of private law, the practice of restricting land in new residential
developments by means of uniform, mutually enforceable deed
covenants has developed into the science of "private zoning."' At the
public law level, the need for long-range planning, for regulation of the
increasing demand for public services, and for orderly control over the
dispersion of urban population groups has engendered a vast matrix of
zoning and allied regulations.2 With increasing frequency, the real estate
lawyer is confronted with the need to determine the effect of a newly
enacted zoning ordinance upon the enforceability of prior restrictive
covenants affecting property in the zoned area. If the enforceability of
the covenant is cut off by the ordinance, the further question arises
whether the city must compensate the landowner for interfering with
his property rights. Existing rules provide largely unsatisfactory answers
and conclusions reached do not always reflect the balancing of public
against private interests fundamental to all zoning. Moreover, new types
of zoning regulations have been found to generate conflicts between
public and private interests that were not foreseen when these regulations
were first promulgated. This Note will set forth the present state of the
law and will analyze the existing rules in terms of judicial approach and
the constitutionally permissible scope of zoning under a state's police
power. It also will suggest possible legislative and judicial innovation
that might clarify and facilitate solution of the problems in this area.
II.

PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

Generally, in real estate law, the more restrictive regulatory device
governs3 when it merely circumscribes uses allowed under a less
I. See Consigny & Zile, Use of Restrictive Covenants in a Rapidly Urbanizing Area, 1958
Wis. L. REV. 612.
2. See C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING ch. 3 (1959); I J. METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING
ch. I (2d ed. 1955).
3. See Bluett v. County of Cook, 19 Il. App. 2d 172, 153 N.E.2d 305 (1958) (zoning
ordinance prevailed over approved, but less restrictive plat); City of Richlawn v. McMakin, 313
Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902 (1950) (less stringent zoning ordinance did not impair legal effect of
private building restrictions); Szilvasy v. Saviers, 70 Ohio App. 34,44 N.E.2d 732 (1942) (restrictive
covenant prevented commercial use allowed by zoning ordinance).
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restrictive device, and does not totally displace them. The operation of
this rule is best understood with reference to cumulative zoning, the
classic pattern of zoning, whereby a hierarchy of land uses is recognized
within one zone.4 Residential uses are the highest, or most restrictive;
industrial uses are the lowest, or least restrictive; and commercial uses
are intermediate. Residential zones for single family dwellings, for
example, are protected from encroachment by multiple family dwellings,
apartment houses, business establishments, and industry of any kind.
Zones designed for each lesser land use, however, are cumulative-any
higher use is permitted, but lesser uses are prohibited.
A.

More Restrictive Covenant

When the covenant is more restrictive than the ordinance, the
operation of the general rule presents no conceptual difficulties since
all higher uses are by definition in conformity with a less restrictive
cumulative zoning ordinance. Covenant rights are independently
enforceable, and the ordinance is construed to mean that only
landowners not burdened with covenant restrictions may use their
properties for purposes contemplated by the zoning ordinance. 5 For
example, when a landowner in a newly zoned commercial district sought,
in reliance upon the ordinance, to erect a gasoline service station on
land restricted by deed covenants to residential uses, the court properly
enjoined this use at the request of other landowners in the restricted
area.'
Despite the general enforceability of the more restrictive private
covenant, at least one court has allowed a landowner relying on a less
restrictive ordinance to prevail. In Taylor v. City of Hackensack,7 land
originally restricted by mutual deed covenants to single-family
residences was subsequently zoned for apartments. Before the zoning
ordinance was enacted, the land was sold to the city, and then by the
city to a private developer. In upholding the validity of the ordinance
and allowing the lesser use, the court declared that a private covenant
could not place a limitation on the power to zone.8 Twenty years later,
4. E. BASSETT, ZONING 63 (1940).
5. Van Hecke, Zoning Ordinancesand Restrictionsin Deeds, 37 YALE L.J. 407,422 (1928).
6. Clintwood Manor, Inc. v. Adams, 54 Misc. 2d 141, 282 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1967),
rev'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 278, 287 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1968), affd, 24 N.Y.2d 759, 247 N.E.2d 667,
299 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1969). See also Morton v. Sayles, 304 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)
(commercial zoning could not override prior existing residential restrictive covenant).
7. 137 N.J.L. 139, 58 A.2d 788 (Sup. Ct.), affd, I N.J. 211, 62 A.2d 686 (1948), noted in
48 MICH. L. REv. 103 (1949).
8. 137 N.J.L. at 142,58 A.2d at 791.
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however, the same court decided a similar issue in favor of the
beneficiaries of a restrictive covenant? Citing and distinguishing Taylor,
the court stated: "[I]n the only cases in which the zoning ordinance
overcame private restrictions, the municipality was the beneficiary of
the covenants."' 0 Although this distinction may not be valid, at least
one authority" has suggested that once title has passed through a city,
the municipality, unlike a private owner, may impliedly waive covenant
restrictions. Some decisions, moreover, have indicated that the mere
presence of a less restrictive zoning ordinance tends to show that the
property in question is better adapted for uses other than the restricted
use required by the covenant.' 2 Courts that take this view could easily
go one step further and invalidate the covenant on the basis of changed
condition, 3 thereby allowing parties relying on the ordinance to erect
a lesser use than the covenant would have allowed.
B.

More Restrictive Ordinance

Unlike the more restrictive covenant, the more restrictive ordinance
impliedly does not allow the continued enforcement of covenant rights
that require less restrictive uses. The conceptual difficulty caused by
this construction has resulted in inconsistent judicial treatment. Thus,
while a more restrictive ordinance generally prevails and renders
unenforceable less restrictive deed covenants, this rule is not based
upon a solid body of authority. As recently as 1970, it was
authoritatively stated that "[tihe question of whether a zoning
ordinance, enacted subsequent to the creation of a restrictive
promise respecting the use of land and directly conflicting with it,
extinguishes the promise, has never been answered in an American
court."" Although there is a dearth of case law squarely in point,
several courts have approached the area through dicta. 5 In a
9. Union County Indus. Park v. Union County Park Comm'rs, 95 N.J. Super. 448, 231
A.2d 812 (Super. Ct. 1967).
10. Id. at 454, 231 A.2d at 815.
II. 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 74-6, § 2 (3d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as RATHKOPF].
12. See, e.g., Bard v., Rose, 203 Cal. App. 2d 232, 21 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1962); Gordon v.
Caldwell, 235 I1. App. 170, 174 (1924).
13. See text accompanying notes 38-42 infra.
14. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY C 686, at 230.4 (rev. ed. P. Rohan 1970).
It was noted that a less restrictive subsequent zoning ordinance does not "directly conflict" with
a prior covenant because the ordinance only allows but does not require a lower use. Id.
15. See Bluett v. County of Cook, 19 I1. App. 2d 172, 153 N.E.2d 305 (1958) (restrictive
covenants do not supersede requirements of zoning ordinance; if covenants are more restrictive
than zoning requirements, they prevail as to purchasers, but if they are less restrictive, zoning
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Wyoming case," for example, the land in question was originally

restricted by deed covenant to business uses, but the municipality
subsequently zoned the same property solely for residential use. The

court upheld a landowner's right to use his property for business
purposes consonant with the covenant restriction, but did not base its
decision on a ground that would contravene the general rule that a
more restrictive ordinance should render unenforceable less restrictive

covenant rights.1 7 The court instead pointed out obiter dictum:
Whether [a case] where the building restriction is for business purposes only and
'the zoning is for residential purposes-the case at bar-should invoke the same
ruling [that the more restrictive device governs], we do not under the present facts
find it necessary to decide. General expressions . . .would seem to indicate an
affirmative answer to this query. 8
Similarly, in a Kentucky case' 9 the court first determined that

a

declaration of restriction filed by a landowner, allowing some business
uses, would not be validly enforceable as a covenant even if no zoning
ordinance were present. The court added, however, that it was unable
to see how a declaration of restriction could give a right to develop the
property for business use when the land was restricted solely to
20
residential use.
Although courts have failed to formulate a comprehensive general
rule with respect to the more restrictive ordinance, the Restatement of
Property has taken a firm position on the issue. Section 568 provides

that:
The obligation arising out of the making of a promise that land of the promisor
shall be used in a specified way is extinguished by a zoning ordinance or similar
legislation only to the extent to which the observance
of the promise is rendered
2
unlawful by the ordinance or other legislation. '

A comment to this section notes that "[s]uch effectiveness is dependent

upon the satisfaction of constitutional limitations upon the destruction
by legislative action of vested property interests.

' 22

This comment

ordinance prevails); City of Richlawn v. McMakin, 313 Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902 (1950) (zoning

ordinance restricting use of land to residential purposes only does not impair vested rights of owner
of unimproved land under prior declaration restricting land usage to residences and certain classes
of business only); Szilvasy v. Saviers, 70 Ohio App. 34, 44 N.E.2d 732 (1942) (deed restrictions
are not abrogated by a zoning ordinance if the ordinance is less restrictive).
16. Weber v. City of Cheyenne, 55 Wyo. 202,97 P.2d 667 (1940).
17. The court found that since petitioner's residentially zoned property was in a
predominantly commercial neighborhood, to allow the ordinance to govern would effectively deny
petitioner not just some uses, but all reasonable beneficial uses of his property, and would therefore
be unreasonably arbitrary and oppressive as applied. 55 Wyo. at 216, 97 P.2d at 672.
18. 55 Wyo. at 215, 97 P.2d at 672.
19. City of Richlawn v. McMakin, 313 Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902 (1950).
20. 313 Ky. at 270, 230 S.W.2d at 906.
21. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 568 (1944).

22. Id., comment d at 3326.
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properly qualifies the operation of the rule as applied to both the more
restrictive cumulative ordinance, and to the increasingly popular
noncumulative ordinance.?
C. Ordinances Blocking All Reasonable Uses of Land
One step beyond the more restrictive zoning ordinance is the
ordinance that not only restricts, but renders totally nugatory the rights
of a landowner to make reasonable use of his property. In one class
of cases, the restriction on use is occasioned solely by the ordinance,
and the aggrieved landowner can successfully attack the validity of the
ordinance only by showing that if it were enforced, the resulting
restriction on his property would preclude its use for any purpose to
which the property is reasonably adapted.2 4 When, for example, a county
zoned an area including plaintiff's land for the single authorized use
of quarrying, and plaintiff was unable to sell the land for quarrying
purposes, the court held the zoning restraint confiscatory in its
operation.25 In these cases, the state must compensate the owner for the
value of his property and must include the value of restrictive covenants,
2
if any, as an additional increment of value.
In a second .class of cases, the land is suitable for the single
authorized use for which it is zoned, but it is burdened by a restrictive
covenant which forbids that use. Although the landowner may desire
to use his property in conformity with the zoning ordinance, he is
prevented from so doing by the threat of his neighbors asserting their
beneficial interests in covenants affecting the use of his land. In this
class of cases, unless the landowner is accorded relief by the courts, the
land stands idle because he cannot violate either the zoning or the
covenant restriction. The effect is the same as in the first class of
cases--eminent domain compensation is required.
Cases of this second type are relatively infrequent and some of those
2
said to be in this class fail to withstand closer scrutiny. In one case,
for example, decided on the basis that the landowner would be denied
23. See text accompanying notes 32-34 infra.
24. E.g., Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938)
(undeveloped, unrestricted area zoned residential); Buckley v. Fasbender, 118 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup.
Ct. 1952), modified, 281 App. Div. 985, 121 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1953) (area rezoned from residential to
industrial); Sundlun v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 50 R.I. 108, 145 A. 451 (1929) (residential zoning
allowing installation of gasoline station if approved; denial of petition reversed as unconstitutional
deprivation of property).
25. Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957).
26. Brickman, The Compensabilityof Restrictive Covenants in Eminent Domain, 13 U. FLA.
L. REV. 147 (1960). See also text accompanying notes 72-78 infra.
27. Weber v. City of Cheyenne, 55 Wyo. 202, 97 P.2d 667 (1940).
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all reasonable uses if the ordinance were to prevail, statements regarding
the superiority of the covenant were mere dicta because the same
restrictions on use would have been present by virtue of the ordinance
even without the effect of the covenant. One writer, on the other hand,
would have reached the same result by applying the rule that favors the
covenant and would have struck down the ordinance as confiscatory,
even though the ordinance was cumulative. 21 It also has been suggested
that a better view would require a finding that the covenant is
unenforceable, thereby deferring to public policy as expressed in the
zoning ordinance.2 9 A recent condemnation case lends support for this
position by stating that "the law frowns on a sterile stalemate on the
use of land."3 " In that case, the landowner's property apparently was
burdened by a residential use covenant and subsequently was zoned
solely for industrial use. The state contended that the proper measure
of value was as residential property, since that was the only use allowed
under the covenant. The landowner, however, relying on the ordinance,
sought to have the land valued as industrial property. The court held
that the proper basis for valuation was as industrial property, thereby
disregarding the effect of the covenant. Unfortunately, the court chose
to support its decision on three different grounds 3 without indicating
whether any single ground would be controlling. The case does suggest,
however, that in conflicts of this nature courts tend to look more to
the public interest and to the hardship on the landowner, and accord
less sanctity to covenant rights.
D. Likelihood of Increasing Litigation
Although cases involving a more restrictive or totally displacing
ordinance are rare under the traditional pattern of cumulative zoning,
the increasing popularity of new techniques, such as noncumulative or
single-use zoning,32 promises to result in increased litigation. Single-use
28. Berger, Conflicts Between Zoning Ordinances and Restrictive Covenants: A Problem
in Land Use Policy, 43 NEB. L. REV. 449,465 (1964).
29. See note 78 infra and accompanying text.
30. 1.77 Acres of Land v. State ex rel. State Highway Dep't, 241 A.2d 513, 516 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1968) (residential restrictive covenant held inapplicable when, because of industrial zoning,
enforcing the covenant would render land unusable).
31. The bases of the court's decision were (I) that the neighborhood had changed, thereby
rendering the continued validity of the covenant doubtful, (2) that there was some question
concerning the applicability of the deed restrictions to the land in question, and (3) that all use
of the land would be denied the landowner if the covenant were permitted to be enforced. Id.
32. Note, Industrial Zoning to Exclude Higher Uses, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1261 (1957);
Comment, Non-cumulative Zoning Ordinances Upheld, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 708 (1959); 52 MICH.
L. REV. 925 (1954); Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1141 (1954).
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zoning may take a number of forms. When an area is declining in value,
a municipality may zone that area for single family residential uses in
order to maintain the land values or the aesthetics of a particular
neighborhood.3 3 More frequently, a municipality may desire to create
an industrial park, excluding higher uses. In either case, the presence
of private covenants almost certainly will give rise to litigation. When
these important public policy goals are in issue they must be balanced
to determine whether rights enjoyed under private covenants will be cut
off, and whether compensation is required. Through single-use zoning,
for example, a high tax base may be preserved for areas of a city with
a heavy demand for particular types of city services, traffic and
industrial safety hazards can be more easily isolated and regulated, and
the overall aesthetic goals of a community can be more readily
34
achieved.
III.

ANALYSIS OF PRESENT LAW

Three major questions confront a court when covenant rights and
ordinances apparently conflict: first, whether any rights of the
landowner are circumscribed by the ordinances; secondly, whether any
rights so circumscribed are derived solely from the covenant rather than
from land ownership generally; and thirdly, whether compensation is
constitutionally required when rights ascribed to a private promise
respecting the use of land are infringed or abrogated by a subsequently
enacted ordinance.
A. Interference with the Rights of a Landowner
Since every zoning ordinance in some measure restricts private land
use 3 5 landowners' rights frequently are circumscribed by zoning
ordinances. There is no problem of interference with the rights of a
landowner, however, when the covenant is more restrictive than the
ordinance, since by definition, under a cumulative zoning scheme the
more restrictive use is approved under a less restrictive ordinance.
33. See, e.g., City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969) (use of private
property can be restricted for the public purpose of preventing deterioration of the neighborhood
and depreciation of property values); Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (1923)
(zoning ordinance restricting land to residential use for the purpose of enhancing the value of
property and adding to the beautification of an adjacent highway held constitutional).
34. See Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 129, 118 A.2d 824, 832 (1955)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (duty of selecting particular uses vested by legislature in the municipal
officials rather than the courts).
35. It is well settled that government has the power to abridge private rights for the public
benefit. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
36. See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.

1038

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

Similarly, rights of a landowner are not cut off by an ordinance when
the covenant itself is found to be outdated and therefore no longer
enforceable. This is simply an expression of the traditional doctrine of
changed conditions.37 While zoning is one factor that courts will consider
in determining whether covenant restrictions should be terminated
because of changed conditions,3 8 the prevailing view is that a change
of zoning classifications alone is not determinative of this issue.3 9 Some
courts, however, have stated that the mere existence of a zoning
ordinance tends to show that the covenant is outdated and should no
longer be enforced. 0 It has been further suggested4" that these courts
accord undue evidentiary weight to zoning classifications because it
allows them to dispose of cases easily on the basis of changed conditions.
In this manner a zoning ordinance does effectively extinguish rights of
the landowner. Many courts, however, seem to have lost sight of the
public policy bases of zoning when deciding cases in which deed
covenants are present. 42 As a result, their opinions seldom reflect a policy
preference in favor of zoning ordinances, but they similarly rarely reach
the question whether any validly subsisting rights of a landowner are
being circumscribed. Using this basic procedure, a Florida court43 has
declared, contrary to the weight of authority, that a restrictive covenant
is not a compensable property right. In that case the question was
whether restrictive covenants prohibiting the nonresidential use of
certain property were applicable to a school board in its attempt to use
the property for a school building. Rejecting the majority view, the court
held that the building restrictions were not true easements, but rather
negative easements or equitable servitudes, and thus were analogous to
contract rights. As such, they were enforceable only as against
individuals, and not as against the state.44 The court stated:
37. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Riviera Estates Ass'n, 7 Cal. App. 3d 449, 87 Cal. Rptr.
150 (1970) (neighborhood unchanged); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. City of Des Plaines, 127 Ill. App.
2d 122, 262 N.E.2d 48 (1970) (changed character or environment of property); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d
1111 (1949).
38. Wolff v. Fallon, 44 Cal. 2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955) (numerous factors considered).
39. Schulman v. Sherrill, 432 Pa. 206, 246 A.2d 643 (1968) (change in character of
neighborhood is only one factor affecting zoning changes).
40. Goodwin Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W.2d 1024 (1938) (covenant
not enforced); Szilvasy v. Saviers, 70 Ohio App. 34, 44 N.E.2d 732 (1942) (covenant not enforced);
Hysinger v. Mullinax, 204 Tenn. 181, 319 S.W.2d 79 (1958) (covenant not enforced). But see
Gordon v. Caldwell, 235 III. App. 170 (1924) (covenant enforced); Bachman v. Colpaert Realty
Co., 101 Ind. App. 306, 194 N.E. 783 (1935) (covenant enforced).
41. Comment, The Effect of Private Restrictive Covenants on Exercise of the Public Powers
of Zoning and Eminent Domain, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 321, 324.
42. See generally Brickman, supra note 26, at 162 n.65.
43. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955).
44. Id. at 640-41.
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The recent trend, and we think the better view, if it is not actually the majority
view, is that so ably presented and adopted . . . in the case of Anderson v. Lynch,
188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85, 122 A.L.R. 1456 . .

.

. There it was concluded . . .

that restrictions of the kind we are concerned with here . . .convey no interest
in the land, are not true easements, and at best may be relied upon and enforced
between the parties thereto and their successors with notice. That Court concluded,
and we think correctly, that such restrictions do not vest in the owners of other
lands in the subdivision a property right for which compensation must be made
in the event such lands are taken for and devoted to a public use even though such
use is inconsistent with the use to which said lands are restricted by private
agreement."

Two criticisms of this approach help to focus upon the need for a
rationale that goes beyond shallow preliminary construction. First, there

is a point beyond which a property right becomes so substantial that
efforts by a court to construe it away become unconvincing. Secondly,
to hold, as these courts do, that a particular type of covenant right is
no longer enforceable because outdated, or that it is not a compensable
right, is to go too far, without regard to the traditional "balancing"
tests required for a noncompensable taking under the police power."

Moreover, many courts still tend to accompany their decisions with
confusing dicta47 indicating that zoning ordinances cannot override,
annul, abrogate, or relieve land from building restrictions placed
thereupon."' A more forthright approach might begin with the premise
that private rights can be restricted by valid zoning ordinances, and then
45. Id. at 642.
46. Action by a municipality in this area can generally be classified as either noncompensable
taking under the police power, or compensable taking under the eminent domain power. For a
more complete discussion see text accompanying notes 64-70 infra.
47. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d 959 (1959) (residential
restriction in commercial area); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. City of Des Plaines, 127 III. App. 2d
122, 262 N.E.2d 48 (1970) (zoning changes are factors to be considered in suit to enforce deed
restrictions); Winfrey v. Marks, 14 Ohio App. 2d 127, 237 N.E.2d 324 (1968) (zoning change
does not invalidate deed restriction of substantial value to other lots); Schulman v. Serrill, 432
Pa. 206, 246 A.2d 643 (1968) (zoning change does not serve as evidence of a change in the character
of the neighborhood); Hysinger v. Mullinax, 204 Tenn. 181, 319 S.W.2d 79 (1958) (change in
character and zoning of area will not preclude suit for damages even though equity will not enforce
deed restrictions); Fox v. Miner, 467 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1970) (zoning change does not destroy deed
restrictions, but is a factor to be considered when determining whether equitable enforcement is
justified); Annot., 54 A.L.R. 843 (1928).
48. Many zoning ordinances, particularly early ones, contain recitals expressly disavowing
any purpose to interfere with existing deed covenants. See, e.g., Burgess v. Magarian, 214 Iowa
694, 243 N.W. 356 (1932); Kramer v. Nelson, 189 Wis. 560, 208 N.W. 252 (1926). The zoning
ordinances are strikingly similar. The Des Moines ordinance provided that: "It is not intended
by this ordinance to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements, covenants or other
agreement between parties." 214 Iowa at 699, 243 N.W. at 358. The Milwaukee ordinance provided
that: "It is not intended by this chapter to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements,
covenants or other agreements between parties." 189 Wis. at 565, 208 N.W. at 254.
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proceed to inquire into the validity of the ordinance as it infringes on
the property rights in question.
B. Status of the Covenant Right
Statements that zoning ordinances can never supersede private
agreements often convey the idea that some peculiar sanctity is attached
to the concept of a private covenant and that a zoning ordinance is
invalid to the extent that it interferes with covenant rights.49 It thus
becomes appropriate to address the second question posed-whether a
deed covenant constitutes a separate property right above and in
addition to rights generally arising out of land ownership. More
narrowly stated, the inquiry is whether the addition of a covenant right
on a particular parcel of land will render unduly oppressive or
confiscatory that which would otherwise constitute a valid,
noncompensable exercise of police power. 5
The.view that a valid deed restriction "isneither nullified nor
superseded by the adoption or enactment of a zoning ordinance" 5 t is
often proclaimed to be a creature of dicta. 52 This position, however, finds
some support in the rationale that any rights of the owner cut off by
the zoning ordinance are derived from land ownership generally, rather
than from the covenant.5 3 According to this approach, the covenant is
not relevant, since it can neither increase nor diminish rights inherent
in land ownership to which no covenants are attached. It is this latter
bundle of rights against which an ordinance should be measured in
determining whether the ordinance is within the police power. One noted
authority,5 moreover, has rejected the view that the validity of an
ordinance is related to the existence of a private promise respecting the
use of land, and has asserted that covenants and ordinances are entirely
49. See, e.g., Annot., 54 A.L.R. 843 (1928).
50. It should be noted that a negative answer to this question does not preclude the possibility
that a covenant right may yet be a conceptually separate property right, since the test of when a
property right is of such magnitude that it cannot be restricted without compensation is not
absolute, but is determined by the relative restrictions of use imposed by the ordinance. For a
discussion of this test see text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
51. Dolan v. Brown, 338 Ill. 412, 419, 170 N.E. 425, 428 (1930) (residential restriction in
area zoned commercial).
52. Berger, supra note 28; 1963 Wis. L. REV. 321.
53. Van Hecke, supra note 5, at 421.
54. "The zoning restrictions imposed upon a property owner's land are the measure of his
obligations to the community; the obligation of a private covenant is merely an indication of the
measure of his obligation to a private party, which may or may not be enforceable, but which
cannot, in either event, affect the necessity of conforming to the comprehensive plan set forth in
the ordinance." Rathkopf 74-3.
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separate and independent obligations. 55 This view is significant in
recognizing that the rule firmly entrenched by Village of Euclid v.
A mbler Realty Co., 5 establishing priority for zoning ordinances that
conflict with private rights, also places zoning ordinances in a position
superior to rights acquired under private covenants. Thus a covenant
right is not a distinct interest in land that must be approached with some
device other than the zoning ordinance if it is to be in any way restricted.
What remains unclear is whether the covenant right represents some
element of value, other than a separate property right, which courts may
freely disregard without compensation to the owner.
The view that all landowners' rights are derived from general
ownership is not in harmony with eminent domain cases.5 7 These cases
continue to treat a covenant right as something qualitatively different
from rights arising from general ownership, and consider it an element
of value possessed by the landowner that cannot be violated by the
municipality without compensation to the landowner. Moreover, both
courts and municipalities often recognize some right or element of value
in the landowner in addition to rights arising out of land ownership by
allowing certain existing uses"' to remain for a period of time after they
have been formally disallowed by a zoning ordinance. 59 Thus, insofar
as restrictive covenants are not imposed expressly to block or to increase
the award in eminent domain proceedings, they are generally viewed as
constituting a distinct and separate property right. ' " Even though this
rule may not be desirable in all cases, at least a beneficiary whose
covenant right is rendered worthless by a zoning ordinance probably
can obtain compensation therefor on the ground that a vested right has
been taken for public use.
C. Is Compensation ConstitutionallyRequired?
Constitutional guarantees of private rights are subject to the
55. Mr. Rathkopf has stated that: "The absurdity of a claim that a zoning restriction which
is fully operative against land theretofore wholly free from any restriction, is ineffective against
land burdened with a private restriction is obvious." Id. at 74-4 n.4.
56. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
57. See text accompanying notes 72-78 infra.
58. E.g.. Rehfeld v. City &County of San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 21 P.2d 419 (1933) (grocery
store in area rezoned residential); Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42,
176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958) (nonconforming junkyard business to terminate within 3 years).
59. See generally Anderson, Nonconforming Uses-A Product of Euclidian Zoning, 10
SYRACUSE L. REv. 214 (1959); Katarincic, Elimination of Non-conforming Uses, Buildings, and
Structures by Amortization-Concept Versus Law, 2 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1 (1963); Norton,
Eliminationof Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 LAW &CONTEMP. PROB. 305 (1955).
60. Smith v. Clifton Sanitation Dist., 134 Colo. 116, 300 P.2d 548 (1956).
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qualification that they may be restricted by governmental agencies
acting under the police power of the state.6 ' In order for a zoning
ordinance to so restrict property rights, the ordinance must satisfy two
conditions. First, the purpose for which the ordinance is enacted must
bear a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.12 Secondly, the ordinance must not permanently restrict
the use of the property involved so that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose. Even if the ordinance satisfies the first
constitutional test, failure to meet the second requirement is generally
regarded as a taking of property without just compensation, and
therefore beyond the permissible scope of police power. 3 The
constitutional validity of a zoning ordinance that is imposed on an area
subject to pre-existing restrictive covenants, primarily turns on whether
the ordinance satisfies the second test, relative to the burden of the
regulation on the landowner.
At Least one article has stated that the difference between
noncompensable, constitutionally permissible damage to a property
owner under the police power, and a deprivation of property rights that
requires compensation under the power of eminent domain is merely
one of degree.64 A recent Missouri decision6 5 similarly has recognized
that these two concepts inevitably shade over into one another. That
case upheld the validity of a single statute providing for joint exercise
of zoning and eminent domain powers in a municipality's efforts to
revive an old residential area of the city by zoning it exclusively for single
family residences. The case makes the significant suggestion that a
balancing test must be employed to determine whether compensation
is required, and that the loss in value to the landowner in having to
comply with the ordinance must vary with the balance. Thus, a single
exercise of public authority may require compensation for some
landowners but not for others.
1. Diminution in Value Test.-The heart of the problem whether
61. Eleopoulos v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 247, 250, 120 N.E.2d 555, 557 (1954) (zoning
ordinance that prohibited commercial use within residentially zoned area held reasonable and in
the public interest).
62. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
63. Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 F. Supp. 682 (D. Md. 1961) (plaintiff failed to prove that he
could not receive a reasonable return on the fair value of the property if he had to comply with
the zoning ordinance). See also Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d
587 (1938) (residence-zoning restriction held invalid when plaintiff showed he could not make a
reasonable use of the property within the zoning requirement).
64. Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policyand Concept, 42 CAL. L. REV. 596, 609
(1954).
65. City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).
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to require compensation is describing the point at which an

uncompensated interference with private rights in land constitutes an
unconstitutional taking. One formula, designed to define this point,
requires a balancing of the urgency of the condition sought to be

corrected against the cost to the property owner of complying with the
new ordinance-the diminution in value of the landowner's property."

One California court has attempted to apply this formula by instructing
that:
The fact that plaintiffs property may depreciate in value as a result of rezoning
does not establish unreasonableness or invalidity, for "damages caused by a proper
exercise of the police power is merely one of the prices an individual must pay as
a member of society."'"

This cost of societal membership is not unlimited, however, and it is

generally held that substantial decreases in property value will warrant
compensation. In one case,6 8 for example, the value of a parcel of land

zoned solely for residential use increased from 8,728 dollars to 28,000
dollars over a seven year period. The ordinance was held not to require
compensation as being confiscatory, even though at the end of the same
period the land would have been worth between 100,000 and 125,000
dollars if used for industrial purposes. Although cases continue to hold

that there is a limit to the extent to which a city can properly destroy
or diminish property values without compensation,69 it is difficult to
predict, in any one case, precisely where this limit will be drawn.70
Every court faced with an ordinance, which, if upheld, would render
covenant rights either unenforceable or of less value, must come down
on one side or the other of the line dividing noncompensable police power
66.

Incorporated Village v. Paulgene Realty Corp., 24 Misc. 2d 790, 200 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup.

Ct. 1960) (defendants were not compelled to erect an expensive fence because there would be no
justifiable corresponding benefit to the general public).
67. Robinson v. City of Los Angeles, 146 Cal. App. 2d 810, 304 P.2d 814 (1956). This
application, however, may be criticized as circular, since the validity of the exercise of police power
is the very question that is posed.
68. Baum v. City and County of Denver, 147 Colo. 104, 363 P.2d 688 (196 1).
69. See, e.g., Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d 822 (1959)
(no unconstitutional taking of property when only one particular type of structure was denied a
construction permit); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute prohibiting
sub-surface coal mining where it would cause subsidence of dwellings was an unconstitutional
extension of the police powers when the landowner had deeded the land with express reservation
of the right to remove all coal beneath the surface).
70. In State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 105, 147 A. 294, 299 (1929), there appeared to be
no limit whatsoever upon nonconfiscatory police power taking. In that case, the city refused to
allow restoration after more than 50% of a company's buildings were destroyed by fire. This was
held to be a fair exercise of the police power when the restoration, if permitted, would have
continued a nuisance in a zoned area.
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taking from compensable eminent domain taking. 7' The primary
obstacle to characterizing violations of private promises as
noncompensable police power takings is not as most courts conclude
that a private promise respecting the use of land represents an element
of value in addition to other values arising out of land ownership. It
is, rather, that many courts seem to apply the diminution in value test
to covenant rights separately, rather than considering the covenant right,
and the value thereof that inures to the beneficiary, as an integral part
of the entire bundle of property rights.
If the value of a private promise respecting the use of land is viewed
as a separate right for the purpose of balancing it against the public
purpose sought to be achieved by a zoning ordinance, then it is difficult
to see how any diminution of that value by a public authority could
be less than a complete taking and a total restriction of use, requiring
compensation under eminent domain power. In one early case, 72 a
Michigan court determined that when a municipality sought to erect a
fire station on land restricted to residential use, the violation of private
covenants was more than a mere permissible regulation under the police
power; it amounted to an appropriation of private rights requiring
compensation to the beneficiaries of the covenants. Rejecting the defense
that a municipality is not bound by such covenants, the court held that
the validity of a building restriction is affected neither by the character
of the parties in interest nor by the nature of the public interest sought
to be promoted. 73 Similarly, compensation was required when
beneficiaries of restrictive covenants objected to the building of a public
school in a restricted residential area. 7 Finally, in a Tennessee decision, 75
a municipality proceeded to erect a water tower on one of several lots
subject to residential restrictions. The court, however, held that
compensation was required, stating: "[T]he ownership of the right to
restrict the use of a given parcel of land to a certain use is, to that extent,
a property right in that lot, for which, when deprived thereof, he [the
'76
landowner] should be compensated.
71. This, of course, assumes that the court does not construe away the covenant right without
reaching the question whether the ordinance should prevail. See text accompanying notes 37-49
supra.
72. Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911).
73. Jd. at 473, 133 N.W. at 320.
74. Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 A. 245 (1928).
75. City of Shelbyville v. Kilpatrick, 204 Tenn. 484, 322 S.W.2d 203 (1959). Contra, Moses
v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. McNeill, 238
Ark. 244, 381 S.W.2d 425 (1964).
76. 204 Tenn. at 490, 322 S.W.2d at 206.
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Courts following the majority rule,77 that a restrictive covenant is
a compensable interest for the purpose of eminent domain proceedings,
have created a logical straightjacket that makes it conceptually difficult
ever to treat the abrogation of covenant rights as a noncompensable
taking within the police power. It is difficult to imagine a fact situation
in which a court taking this approach and viewing the covenant as a
separate property right would consider the abrogation of a covenant
right as a mere restriction rather than as an appropriation or taking.
It would seem that a private promise, if it is isolated conceptually as
a separate right, must either exist as an enforceable right, or not exist
at all. Moreover, because of the strained fiscal condition of many state
and local governments, the persistence of this view, as a practical matter,
might cause the total obstruction of much public planning.
2. ProposedStandard.-It is suggested that a better formula for
determining whether compensation is required is by measuring the
diminution in value of a landowner's property against the entire bundle
of rights, or value, to which he is entitled by virtue of: (1) land ownership
generally; and (2) any substantial value arising out of private promises
regarding use of the land. Were courts to consider the value of the
remaining range of uses available to a landowner, then a finding that
a violation of a covenant right constitutes a valid noncompensable
taking would be at once easier, and more equitable. Moreover, under
a "total value" approach it might be found that the source of
diminution in value in many cases is due to a change in neighborhood
conditions rather than to the enactment of the zoning ordinance. When
an area previously restricted by deed covenants to residential use is later
zoned exclusively for industrial purposes, the diminution in value caused
by the ordinance is necessarily slight if the area is already becoming
industrial, and property values for residential uses were declining even
before the passage of the ordinance."
77. See generally Brickman, supra note 26.
78. See RATHKOPF 74-4, -5 which states: "The rule expressed above would meet its sternest
test in a situation in which land restricted by covenant to one family dwelling use was placed by
the zoning ordinance in a district in which only industrial uses were permitted and from which
dwellings were expressly excluded. Two different contrary approaches to this problem are possible:
I. That in the light of the existence of the covenant prohibiting uses other than for one family
residence, the operation of the ordinance renders the land unuseable for any purpose; consequently
the ordinance operates in confiscatory manner and is unconstitutional.
2. That the private covenant is unenforceable (a) because of public policy, and (b) because
those conditions which uphold the zoning restriction itself as reasonable, including the ordinance
restriction itself, and the actual industrial use of the other lands in the district inspired by the
zoning ordinance render the private covenant restriction unreasonably oppressive and incapable
of enforcement. Of the two approaches, undoubtedly the latter would be the one adopted by the

1046

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

This reasoning, however, does not withstand critical analysis in all
situations. It is not at all clear, for example, that a change in
neighborhood from multiple family dwellings to single family residential
units works any diminution in value when the covenants previously
allowed multiple family uses and the subsequent ordinance established
a district exclusively for single family dwellings. In all probability, the
land unrestricted by the ordinance would be of more value for
apartments than for single family dwellings. Thus any diminution in
value when the ordinance attempts to impose a higher use than required
by deed covenants, is clearly traceable to the ordinance.
Although this source-of-the-detriment test does not always absolve
the city of a causal relation to any loss in value of the landowner's total
property right, it is an important, and in fact quite equitable approach
that every court should consider when deciding whether compensation
is required. As a component of the overall approach that courts should
be taking, this test rejects mechanical rules and reinstates a case-bycase balancing approach, ultimately producing decisions more just to
both the municipality and the private landowner.
IV.

SUGGESTIONS FOR NEw LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES

Private promises respecting the use of land do not preclude the
effectuation of public zoning ordinances. Deed covenants merely
interfere with zoning ordinances by imposing a potential burden of
compensation on the municipality. Since a majority of courts regard
the covenant right as a compensable interest and since conflicts between
covenants and zoning ordinances promise to become more frequent with
increased employment of new zoning techniques, new approaches for
dealing with the covenant-zoning conflict are needed to insure an
equitable balancing of competing interests and to develop a set of rules
more useful to bench and bar alike. Unless the legislature intervenes
with some legally acceptable plan for terminating deed restrictions or
unless the courts develop an innovative approach that balances the
competing interests and resolves the conflict, private promises respecting
the use of land in many cases will be made to yield only at a cost to
the city far in excess of any benefit to be derived from the termination
courts. Assuming an industrially zoned district reasonably developed as such and with land values
for such use obtainable with respect to lands not burdened by such covenant, it is apparent that
the confiscation of value does not arise through operation of the zoning restriction. It is also obvious
that land, situated in a district zoned 'industrial' and substantially used for such purpose, would
have little, if any, value for single family residences, and that this would be the source of any
confiscation of value that might exist." Cf. Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d
959 (1959); Clintwood Manor, Inc. v. Adams, 29 App. Div. 2d 278, 287 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1968).
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of the restrictions. 79 Traditional means of discharging outdated deed
covenants will not operate on all such covenants."0 Moreover, the
impoverished fiscal condition of most state and local governments
precludes, as a practical matter, resort to eminent domain to terminate
obstructive deed covenants.
A.

Suggestionsfor Legislative Innovation

Although the power to zone generally is delegated by the state to
municipalities, any discussion of zoning would be incomplete without
a consideration of other means by which a state legislature can exercise
its police power for the purpose of affecting efficient land use. A number

of states have enacted statutes that purport to limit the effective duration
of land control devices such as restrictive covenants, rights of entry, and

powers of termination.81 Most authorities agree 2 that there is no
constitutional bar to the prospective application of these statutes. 83 It
is generally held, however, that the retroactive application of these
statutes is unconstitutional as a violation of due process of law and
impairment of contractual obligations." Nonetheless, legislation of this

nature is an eminently workable solution to many of the problems that
arise in this area., Legislation with prospective application will, over a
79. "Were we to recognize a right of compensation in such instances, it would place upon
the public an intolerable burden wholly out of proportion to any conceivable benefits to those
who might be entitled to compensation." Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands,
81 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 1955).
80. See Winfrey v. Marks, 14 Ohio App. 2d 127, 237 N.E.2d 324 (1968) (covenant or
restriction is still of substantial value to the dominant lot, notwithstanding the changed conditions
of the neighborhood in which the lot is situated and equity will restrain violation of the covenant).
81. The following states limit the duration of restrictive covenants, rights of entry, and
powers of termination: ARM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-436 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1188-4 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-97 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.18 (1969); GA. CODE
ANN. § 29-301 (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 37(g)-(h) (Smith-Hurd 1969); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 614.24-.25 (Supp. 1971); Ky. STAT. ANN. § 381.219 (1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 103 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 3 (1970); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.46 (1957);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.20 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2,102 (1966); N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTIONS LAW §§ 1951, 1953-55 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 345 (McKinney
1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-4-19 to -21 (1969).
82. See Comment, Legislative Limitation of Reverter and Forfeiture Provisions In
Conveyances and Devises of Land-A Proposed Statute for Kansas, 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 346,
349-51 (1967); cf. Aigler, Constitutionalityof Marketable Title Acts, 50 MICH. L. REV. 185 (1951).
83. Georgia, for example, enacted one such statute in 1935. [1935] Ga. Acts 112. Although
27 years later it materially altered the scope of this statute, there were no reported cases challenging
its prospective application. See [1962] Ga. Acts 540.
84. See, e.g., Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954); Board of Educ.
v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965). Courts may be prepared to
uphold the retroactive application of these statutes when the termination of rights fits within the
bounds of noncompensable police power taking. See text accompanying notes 91-92 infra.
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period of time, begin to yield its rewards in the form of fewer outdated
covenants. As an added precaution, a clear statement of legislative intent
should accompany any legislation terminating property interests in
order to provide a stronger basis for a subsequent judicial holding that
the legislative action was a proper exercise of police power.8 5 Another
type of statute, generally referred to as a "marketable title act," ' 6
requires periodic recordation of a declaration of intention to reserve
certain interests in land in order to maintain the effectiveness of the
interests. 7 Generally, however, the purpose of this kind of statute is to
enable landowners, not public zoning authorities, to remove or prevent
enforcement of obsolete, uncertain, or otherwise objectionable
restrictions.88 The same constitutional principles as discussed above
apply a fortiori when such restrictions are sought to be removed in the
name of public planning.
In addition to directly regulating property interests by limiting the
duration of their enforceability, state legislatures also might consider
the feasibility of indirect regulation. First, legislatures might alter
certain evidentiary rules in order to assure that the collective benefit to
the public receives adequate consideration in determining whether
compensation should be required. A legislature, for example, might
declare that zoning is rebuttably presumed to constitute a change of
condition within the zoned area for the purpose of applying the wellrecognized change of neighborhood doctrine. By shifting the burden of
proof, a statute of this kind would more readily give effect to the public
policy expressed in the zoning ordinance and would keep many otherwise
frivolous challenges to zoning ordinances out of the courts. The
85. W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 75 n.45 (1961): "The
statement could well be expanded by stressing that: (a) Land is the one basic resource of the
economy and that any private arrangement which prevents its most economical use is against the
public interest, (b) Unrealistic or obsolete restrictions reduce the value of land and thus reduce
the tax base and require proportionately higher taxes on unrestricted land, and (c) Land use
planning by public authorities in the public interest has now reduced the need for, and utility of,
private restrictions for private purposes."
86. See, e.g., Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957); Note, The
Massachusetts Marketable Title Act, 44 B.U.L. REV. 201 (1964).
87. The following state statutes provide for marketable title acts which require rerecording:
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 47-33(c) to (g) (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 712.01-.06 (Supp.
1971-72); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 27-29 (Smith-Hurd 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1101
to -1106 (Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.17 (Supp. 1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1271.1279 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.023 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288 to -298
(1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-01 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47-.56 (Baldwin
1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 61-66 (Supp. 1970-71); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 4330-1 to -15 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-1 to -6 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1969). Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 893.15 (Supp. 1971-72).
88. Labounty v. Vickers, 352 Mass. 337, 225 N.E.2d 333 (1967).
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landowner, moreover, would not be denied an opportunity to obtain
compensation for the violation of the covenant if he could establish that
the private promise was of substantial value to him even when viewed
as a part of the total value of his parcel.
Secondly, legislatures might consider subjecting private covenants
to mandatory judicial or administrative review s9 as a condition precedent
to their creation or enforceability. Presently the only requirements for
creating mutually enforceable restrictions are (1) the intent of the
parties, and (2) some form of notice thereof to owners and subsequent
purchasers. 0 There seems to be a compelling public policy argument
that, to be allowed effect, the deed covenants should be subject to the
same judicial review as zoning ordinances. It is beyond doubt that
officials who draft zoning plans are more politically responsible than
private developers, and even their designs are almost uniformly subjected
to judicial or administrative review. It is equally important that privately
imposed plans for land use conform to the general development scheme
of the community.
B.

Suggestionsfor JudicialInnovation

In addition to legislative approaches, courts can open the door,
within constitutional limits, to the timely resolution of problems caused
by conflicting land use techniques. Initially, courts should
conscientiously attempt, within the bounds of the police power, to
uphold the retroactive application of statutes that restrict undesirable
property interests. Despite the general rule to the contrary, some courts
have succeeded in justifying interference with covenant rights without
requiring compensation by holding that the interest abrogated is a
species of property rather than a vested property interest, and that there
has not been a sufficient interference with that property to constitute a
compensable taking. A Florida court,9 for example, has declared, at
least in cases of destruction of covenant rights when public buildings
are involved, that a covenant is not a true easement and therefore not
a compensable property right. Similarly, an Illinois court92 has dealt
creatively with the question of permissible interference. School trustees
89. Note, Validity Rules Concerning Public Zoning and Private Covenants: A Comparison
and Critique, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 409 (1966).
90. Comment, Removing Old Restrictive Covenants-An Analysis and Recommendation,
15 U. KAN. L. REV. 582, 583 (1971).
91. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955);
see text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
92. Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955).
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brought suit under the Illinois Reverter Act93 to have any possibilities
of reverter in connection with the school board's property declared
invalid. Defendants attacked the retroactive application of the statute
on constitutional grounds. Upholding the validity of the Reverter Act,
the court commented:
The statute reflects the General Assembly's appraisal of the actual economic
significance of these interests, weighed against the inconvenience and expense caused
by their continued existence for unlimited periods of time without regard to altered
circumstances.Y

The rationale adopted by the court is unique in that it squarely decides
the issue in terms of the operation of police power upon otherwise valid
private property rights. Moreover, in using language like "actual
economic significance" the court appears to view the possibility of
reverter as just one element of value arising from land ownership
generally, rather than falling into the trap of treating the interest as a
separate bundle of property rights. The interpretative techniques
employed by these courts may someday provide the basis for judicial
expansion of the power of the state to terminate certain types of property
interests constitutionally without compensation.
No case has yet arisen in which a municipality has sought to enjoin
a landowner from using his own property for a purpose consistent with
his own deed covenants, but contrary to a subsequent, more restrictive,
zoning ordinance. It is unclear whether covenant rights can be
overridden so readily when no public building project is involved. It is
submitted, however, that this extension was made, by implication, in
Taylor v. City of Hackensack,15 and that this approach might be useful
for courts desiring to reach similar conclusions. The crucial question
is whether the private use comes within the penumbra of "public
purpose." In most instances in which private developers seek to put
property to uses inconsistent with a subsequent comprehensive zoning
plan, the courts are armed with a sufficiently strong "public purpose"
argument to enjoin enforcement of the covenants attached to the
property without requiring compensation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The sole constitutional barrier to allowing ordinances to prevail
over covenants is the requirement that property shall not be taken for
public use without the payment of just compensation. Applying the two
93.
94.
95.

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30 § 37e (Smith-Hurd 1969).
Trustees ofSchools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 492, 130 N.E.2d 1I1, 115 (1955).
137 N.J.L. 139, 58 A.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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accepted modes of state action to the private covenant produces a rule
that finds (1) a noncompensable taking within the police power when
the covenant is merely regulated, and (2) a compensable eminent domain
situation when the covenant is taken. It is suggested that in all cases,
what is being "acted upon" by state action is not the covenant, but
rights arising out of ownership generally. Therefore the determination
whether a "regulation" or a "taking" has occurred must be made by
comparing the total value of the landowner's rights before the
governmental restrictions are imposed with the value after the
restrictions are taken into account.
Under the present law this method of balancing interests generally
is not followed. As a result governmental restriction is often obtained
at a high cost that far overcompensates the private landowner for the
amount of detriment actually suffered. If the gain to the public is small
when compared to the hardship imposed upon an individual property
owner, then there is no valid basis for a noncompensable taking. If it
appears plainly, however, that the benefit to the public is substantial
when compared to the detriment to the private owner, then courts should
be able to authorize the imposition of the ordinance without the
requirement of compensation despite violation of covenant rights. The
better view seems to be that a covenant right is not a property right in
the traditional sense of being something possessed by virtue of
ownership, and it is clear that the zoning power cannot be impeded by
such rights. It is suggested, however, that American courts find some
element of value in these rights that must be thrown into the balance
on the side of the landowner in determining whether an ordinance
constitutes a taking.
The suggestions offered herein are directed toward finding
techniques to insure a more equitable balancing of interests when the
compensability of an ordinance restriction is in question. The problem
whether compensation is required when deed covenants conflict with
zoning ordinances or otherwise impede public planning is one with which
courts will have to live for some time. It should be made clear, however,
that there are few if any areas in which the weight of the public interest
does not justify at least some noncompensable takings in a society in
which private property rights have become so deeply interwoven in
public planning and necessity.
WADE B. PERRY, JR.

